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Dean (Sean) v. Sheriff, 138 Nev. Adv. Op. 2 (Jan. 13, 2022)1
HABEAS CORPUS: INTRODUCTION OF RACIAL ANIMUS IS INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

SUMMARY
During voir dire, Dean’s defense counsel discussed racial stereotypes in a careless
manner. The Court concluded that counsel’s performance was unreasonable and resulted in
prejudice to Dean. The district court erred in denying Dean’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Dean was charged with attempted murder with the use of a deadly weapon and related
offenses. Counsel questioned prospective jurors about racial bias, insisting that prospective
jurors must be aware of racial stereotypes about African Americans, such as being “violent” or
“sneaky.” One vocal prospective juror disavowed racial prejudice. Counsel asked the juror about
further racial stereotypes, such as whether Dean had a propensity for violence because he is
Black.
The jury found Dean guilty. The district court sentenced him to prison. The court of
appeals affirmed. Dean filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging ineffective assistance
of counsel because counsel introduced racial stereotypes during voir dire. The district court
denied the petition and Dean appealed.
DISCUSSION
Ineffective assistance of counsel occurs when counsel’s performance is less than
objectively reasonable and results in prejudice.2 Prejudice occurs when there is a reasonable
probability of a different outcome that is sufficient to undermine confidence in the actual
outcome of the proceedings.3 For postconviction relief, a petitioner must show both unreasonable
performance and prejudice.4 In reviewing a petition, the Court defers to the district court’s
factual findings if they are supported by substantial evidence and not clearly erroneous. 5
Questions of law are reviewed de novo. 6
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Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984); Warden v. Lyons, 100 Nev. 430, 432–33, 683 P.2d 504,
404 (1984).
3
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88; Johnson v. State, 133 Nev. 571, 576, 402 P.3d 1266, 1273 (2017) (quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).
4
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.
5
Lader v. Warden, 121 Nev. 682, 686, 120 P.3d 1164, 1166 (2005).
6
Id.
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A fair and impartial jury is a constitutional right. 7 Jury selection is an important part of
enforcing that right.8 Counsel may choose to raise the issue of racial bias during voir dire, and in
some instances is compelled to. 9 But discussing racial bias must be done carefully and
responsibly.10
Here, counsel’s probe for possible racial bias was flawed. Counsel suggested that all
African Americans, including Dean, were sneaky and violent. This was not objectively
reasonable, especially given Dean’s charges involving violence, because it could tend to alienate
jurors or legitimize racial prejudice. Counsel’s stated motive was to bring out unconscious racial
bias, but that did not make his conduct reasonable. The vocal prospective juror was offended and
angry about counsel’s questioning during voir dire and denied making assumptions based on
race. Counsel chose to continue asking “problematic racial questions,” which undercut his
purpose to reveal unconscious bias. Counsel’s performance was deficient because there was no
reasonable basis for how he chose to look for racial bias.
This deficient performance prejudiced Dean because his repeated suggestion that African
Americans are violent undermined Dean’s defense. Counsel’s suggestion that African Americans
are sneaky could have undermined Dean’s credibility. The Court found that counsel’s remarks
about not judging Dean by his race did not cure the prejudicial effect of his earlier statements.
Therefore, the Court was not confident in the outcome of the trial. Counsel’s deficient
performance resulting in prejudice meant that Dean had ineffective assistance of counsel.
The Court also noted that the trial court’s inaction heightened its lack of confidence in the
outcome. Judges have the duty and right to exercise reasonable control an attorney’s
participation in voir dire.11 This is especially important to remove racial prejudice from the
justice system. The trial court should have intervened in counsel’s offensive questioning.
CONCLUSION
Counsel’s offensive questioning tainted the jury pool because it introduced racial
prejudice. Therefore, it was objectively unreasonable and prejudiced Dean. The Court reversed
the denial of the habeas petition and remanded for further proceedings.

7

Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36, n.9 (1986).
Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 873 (1989).
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See State v. Bates, 149 N.E.3d 475, 484 (Ohio 2020) (counsel may be ineffective for not questioning a juror
admitting racial bias).
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See Middleton v. State, 64 N.E.3d 895, 901 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).
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